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Why	  propositions?	  (Sarah	  Tietz,	  Zurich)	  	  In	  „Truth	  Rehabilitated“	  Davidson	  wrote	  that	   „Paul	  Horwich	  has	  revived	  what	  we	  may	  call	  propositional	  deflationism.“1	  Horwich	  thesis	  is	  that	  all	  that	  can	  be	  said	  about	  „truth“	  is	  „what	  is	  expressed	  by	  uncontroversial	  instances	  of	  the	  equivalence	  schema,	  	  (E)	   It	  is	  true	  that	  p	  if	  and	  only	  if	  p.“2	  	  	  Accordingly	   truth	   is	  neither	   identical	  with	   the	  property	  of	   corresponding	  with	   reality,	  nor	   with	   coherence,	   nor	   with	   use.	   And	   what's	   more:	   the	   notion	   of	   truth	   is	   also	  independent	  of	  the	  notions	  of	  reference	  and	  satisfaction.	  	  This	  is	  the	  deflationist	  part	  of	  propositional	  deflationism.	  The	  propositional	  part	  aims	  at	  showing	   that	   the	   basic	   bearers	   of	   the	   truth-­‐predicate	   are	   `creatures	   of	   darkness`	   -­‐-­‐	  namely,	  propositions.	  	  Why?	   Firstly,	   because	   ordinary	   language	   use	   suggests	   it.	   As	   Horwich	   notices:	   “the	  ordinary	   truth	   predicate	   is	   primarily	   applied	   to	   such	   things	   as	   `what	   John	   believes`,	  `what	   we	   are	   supposing	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   argument`,	   `what	   Mary	   was	   attempting	   to	  express`,	  and	  so	  on	  –	  that	  is,	  not	  to	  sentences,	  but	  to	  propositions.”3	  Secondly,	  so-­‐called	  propositional	   attitudes	   should	   be	   conceived	   as	   relations	   between	   a	   person	   and	   a	  proposition,	   because	   only	   then,	   or	   so	   Horwich	   claims,	   can	   we	   provide	   an	   adequate	  account	  of	  the	  logical	  properties	  of	  belief	  attributions	  and	  the	  like.	  Thus,	  if	  we	  treat	  the	  “that	  p”	  in	  a	  belief-­‐attribution	  like	  “Oscar	  believes	  that	  p”	  as	  a	  singular	  term	  we	  can	  infer	  that	  there	  is	  something	  that	  Oscar	  believes.	  Or	  better,	  if	  we	  treat	  the	  “that	  p”	  in	  a	  belief-­‐attribution	  we	   accept	   as	   true	   as	   a	   singular	   term	   then	  we	   can	   take	   this	   assumption	   to	  entail	   that	   there	   is	   something	   that	   is	  believed,	  namely	  a	  proposition.	  And	   if	  we	  accept	  propositions	  as	  the	  referents	  of	  “that	  p”	  we	  can	  also	  subsume	  inferences	  under	  familiar	  logical	  rules.	  Accordingly	  from	  	  (1)	  Oscar	  believes	  that	  it	  will	  rain	  and	  	  (2)	  Betsy	  doubts	  that	  it	  will	  rain	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we	  can	  infer	  (3)	  Oscar	  believes	  what	  Betsy	  doubts.4	  	  The	  third	  reason	  Horwich	  gives	  for	  the	  thesis	  that	  propositions	  are	  the	  basic	  bearers	  of	  the	   truth-­‐predicate	   is	   that	   Quine	   and	   his	   followers	   argue	   in	   a	   question	   begging	   way	  when	   they	   claim	   that	   only	  material	   objects	   exist	   and	   that	   therefore	   propositions	  with	  merely	  intensional	  criteria	  of	  identity	  cannot	  exist.	  	  Now,	   in	   order	   to	   answer	   my	   title-­‐question	   I	   shall	   not	   discuss	   these	   three	   reasons	  Horwich	  gives	  for	  the	  necessary	  assumption	  of	  propositions.	  What	  I	  shall	  do	  instead	  is	  discuss	  a	   famous	  Davidsonian	  objection	  against	  Horwich`s	   truth	   theory	  as	  a	  whole.	  As	  shall	   be	   shown,	   there	   is	   an	   answer	   to	   this	   objection	   that	   is	   along	   the	   line	   Davidson	  himself	  once	  proposed.	  But	  in	  order	  for	  it	  to	  work	  we	  must	  make	  use	  of	  propositions.	  	  Now,	   first	   the	   objection	   Davidson	   raised	   against	   Horwich.	   It	   might	   be	   put	   in	   the	  following	  question:	  How	  can	  we	  make	  use	  of	  the	  same	  semantic	  features	  of	  the	  sentence	  which	  occurs	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  “iff”	  in	  giving	  the	  semantics	  of	  the	  equivalence	  schema	  (E)?	  	  The	  problem	  Davidson	  sees	   is	   that	   the	  referents	  of	  a	  contained	   `that`-­‐clause	  cannot	  be	  determinable	  by	  the	  referents	  of	   its	  parts	  because	  substitutions	  of	  co-­‐referential	  terms	  within	   a	   `that`-­‐clause	   will	   not	   always	   preserve	   the	   truth	   value	   of	   the	   containing	  sentence.	  	  An	   obvious	   answer	   in	   the	   Fregean	   vein	  would	   be:	  Well,	   Davidson,	   you	   are	   right.	   In	   a	  `that`-­‐clause	   like	   “John	  believes	   that	  Hesperus	   rotates”	   an	   expression	   indeed	  does	  not	  have	   its	   standard-­‐referent.	  But	   still,	   the	  expression	  has	  a	   referent.	   It	   is	   its	   sense,	  or	   in	  Horwich	   terms,	   its	   meaning.	   Thus,	   “why	   not	   identify	   the	   referent	   of	   `that	   Hesperus	  rotates`with	   the	   meaning	   of	   `Hesperus	   rotates`	   and	   identify	   the	   referents	   (in	   that	  context)	  of	  the	  contained	  words	  `Hesperus`	  and	  `rotates`	  with	  their	  meanings?”5	  Because,	   or	   so	   Davidson	   holds,	   the	  meanings	   of	   words	   in	   `that`-­‐clauses	   just	   are	   their	  
normal	   meanings.	   Or	   at	   least,	   the	   meanings	   of	   words	   in	   `that`-­‐clauses	  must	   be	   their	  normal	  meanings.	   For,	   we	   can	   only	   understand	   a	   sentence	   like	   “The	   proposition	   that	  Hesperus	   rotates”	   if	   we	   understand	   the	   contained	   sentence	   “Hesperus	   rotates”	   in	  isolation.	  Therefore,	  both	  occurrences	  of	   “Hesperus	  rotates”	   in	   the	  bi-­‐conditional	  must	  be	  understood	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  But	  then,	  how	  can	  it	  be	  that	  words	  in	  `that`-­‐clauses	  don't	  have	  their	  standard-­‐referents?	  “And	  if	  they	  do	  have	  their	  standards	  referents	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clauses	   cannot	   refer,	   since	   what	   would	   be	   determined	   by	   those	   standard	   referents	  would	  be	  the	  wrong	  thing	  (e.g.	  `that	  Hesperus	  rotates`	  would	  acquire	  the	  same	  referent	  as	  `that	  Phosphorus	  rotates`).”6	  Overwhelming	  as	  the	  objection	  might	  seem,	  Horwich	  does	  not	  see	  his	  account	  of	   truth	  defeated.	   Along	   Fregean	   lines	   he	   proposes	   to	   “simply	   deny	   that	   meaning	   all	   by	   itself	  determines	  reference.	  We	  can	  allow	  –	  and	  this,	  of	  course,	  is	  completely	  uncontroversial	  –	  that	  the	  referent	  of	  a	  term	  is	  fixed	  in	  part	  by	  the	  context	  in	  which	  it	  occurs.”7	  What	  does	  he	  mean?	  As	  just	  seen,	  words	  can	  occur	  both	  in	  a	  standard	  way	  and	  in	  a	  non-­‐standard	  way.	   According	   to	   Horwich	   a	   standard	   way	   would	   be	   one	   in	   which	   words	   occur	  transparently.	  In	  this	  case	  the	  referent	  of	  a	  word	  like	  “Hesperus”	  would	  be	  one,	  namely	  the	   planet.	   A	   non-­‐standard	  way	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   would	   be	   one	   in	  which	   the	  word	  occurs	   in	   an	   opaque	   way	   as	   is	   the	   case	   in	   `that`-­‐clauses.	   Here	   too	   we	   have	   just	   one	  referent.	  But	  it	  differs	  from	  the	  referent	  in	  transparent	  contexts.	  In	  opaque	  contexts	  like	  in	  `that`-­‐clauses	  the	  referent	  of	  the	  word	  “Hesperus”	  would	  be	  its	  sense,	  or	  meaning.	  	  I	  am	  not	  sure	  whether	  this	  proposal	  still	  doesn’t	  fall	  victim	  to	  Davidson's	  objection.	  For,	  even	  a	  relativization	  to	  different	  contexts	  doesn’t	  rule	  out	   the	   fact	   that	  we	  understand	  “The	   proposition	   that	   Hesperus	   rotates”	   only	   when	   we	   understand	   the	   sentence	  “Hesperus	  rotates”	  in	  isolation.	  That	  is,	  what	  we	  understand	  first	  are	  the	  words	  in	  their	  transparent	  context.	  Now,	  since	  we	  are	  dealing	  with	  bi-­‐conditionals	  the	  occurrences	  of	  “Hesperus	  rotates”	  have	  to	  be	  understood	  in	  the	  same	  way	  on	  both	  sides.	  Accordingly,	  we	  have	   the	  problem	  to	  explain	  how	   it	   can	  be	  possible	   that	  words	   in	   the	   `that`-­‐clause	  could	   not	   be	   understood	   as	   if	   they	   were	   in	   a	   transparent	   context.	   But	   again,	   if	   we	  understood	  words	  in	  `that`-­‐clauses	  as	  if	  they	  were	  in	  a	  transparent	  context	  then	  `that`-­‐clauses	  cannot	  refer	  because	  the	  thusly	  determined	  referents	  would	  be	  wrong.	  	  Does	   this	  mean	  Davidson	   finally	  won?	  Not	   yet.	   As	   said	   in	   the	   beginning,	   I	   think	   there	  might	  be	  one	  proposal	  along	  Davidsonian	  lines	  that	  could	  be	  an	  answer	  to	  his	  objection.	  	  In	  “On	  saying	  that”	  Davidson	  suggests	  to	  analyze	  belief-­‐attributions	  or	  other	  attributions	  of	  mental	   states	  not	  as	  one	  sentence	  containing	  another	   in	  a	  non-­‐transparent	  position	  but	  as	  a	  sequence	  of	  sentences,	  that	  is,	  as	  a	  parataxis.	  Hence,	  the	  expression	  “Galileo	  said	  that	  the	  earth	  moves”	  does	  not	  contain	  of	  one	  sentence,	  containing	  another	  but	  of	   two	  sentences,	  namely	  of	  “Galileo	  said	  that”	  and	  of	  “The	  earth	  moves.”	  What	  is	  of	  importance	  is	  that	  the	  “that”	  in	  the	  first	  sentence	  is	  a	  demonstrative,	  not	  a	  complementizer.	  It	  refers	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to	  an	  utterance	   the	   speaker	   is	   just	  about	   to	  produce,	  here	   to	   the	  utterance	   “The	  earth	  moves”.	  Accordingly,	  the	  first	  utterance	  expresses	  a	  truth	  of	  an	  utterer	  u	  at	  time	  t	  if	  and	  only	   if	   the	   utterance	   designated	   by	   the	   demonstrative	   as	   used	   by	   u	   at	   t	   has	   the	   same	  content	  as	  one	  of	  Galileo's	  beliefs.	  Frege`s	  puzzle,	  or	  so	  it	  seems,	  is	  solved.	  Nothing	  inside	  the	  parataxis	  requires	  an	  intensional	  individuation.	  	  Now	  I	  said	  in	  the	  beginning	  that	  there	  might	  be	  a	  solution	  to	  Horwich`s	  problem	  along	  Davidsonian	   lines,	  and	  one	   that	  necessarily	  makes	  recourse	   to	   intensional	  entities	   like	  propositions.	   As	   should	   be	   clear,	   the	   solution	   cannot	   lie	   in	  Davidson's	   just	  mentioned	  original	  proposal,	  since	  it	  completely	  dispenses	  with	  intensional	  entities.	  But	  in	  the	  way	  just	  mentioned	  Davidson's	  proposal	   is	  not	  without	  problems,	  as	  especially	  Tyler	  Burge	  has	  shown.	  Consider	  the	  following	  argument:8	  	  	  (A1)	   Many	  believe	  that	  the	  earth	  moves.	  	   Therefore,	  many	  believe	  that	  the	  earth	  moves.	  Since	  (A1)	  exemplifies	  the	  schema	  of	  arguments	  by	  repetition,	  `A∴A`,	  it	  is	  formally	  valid.	  So	  a	   fortiori	   it	   is	  valid,	   that	   is,	  when	   the	  conclusion	   is	  not	   true	   it	   is	   impossible	   for	   the	  premiss	  to	  be	  true.	  	  But	  now,	  compare	  the	  paratactic	  counterpart	  of	  (A1),	  (A2)	   Many	  believe	  that.	  The	  earth	  moves.	  	   Therefore,	  many	  believe	  that.	  The	  earth	  moves.	  If	   (A2)	   is	  understood	   in	  a	  Davidsonian	  fashion,	   then	  the	  objects	  designated	  by	  the	  two	  demonstratives	   are	   two	   different	   utterances	   “1”	   and	   “2”.	   Now,	   if	   the	   demonstratives	  designate	  1	  and	  2	  respectively,	  then	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  premiss	  depends	  on	  the	  existence	  of	  1,	  while	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  conclusion	  depends	  on	  the	  existence	  of	  2.	  But	  since	  there	  is	  no	  necessity	  as	  to	  the	  co-­‐existence	  of	  1	  and	  2,	  we	  can	  conceive	  of	  circumstances	  in	  which	  1	  exists	  without	  2.	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  “under	  such	  circumstances	  the	  premiss	  would	  be	  true,	   while	   the	   conclusion	  would	   not	   be	   true.	   So	   (A2)	   is	   not	   valid,	   let	   alone	   formally	  valid.”9	  I	  think	  Burge`s	  and	  Künne`s	  objection	  hits	  Davidson.	  But,	  or	  so	  I	  want	  to	  suggest,	  there	  is	  a	   solution	   that	   is	   still	   along	  Davidson's	   lines.10	   It	   goes	   back	   to	  Wolfgang	  Künne.	   If	  we	  could	   analyse	   belief-­‐attributions	   paratactically,	   nothing,	   Künne	   holds,	   should	   stand	   in	  the	  way	  to	  treat	  Horwich`s	  equivalence	  schema	  (E)	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  I	  am	  referring	  here	  to	  Künne`s	  version	  of	  Burge`s	  objection	  to	  Davidson.	  9	  Künne,	  2009,	  p.	  208.	  10	  This	  suggestions	  stems	  from	  Künne	  2009,	  329.	  
Thus,	  “The	  proposition	  that	  dogs	  bark	  is	  true	  if	  and	  only	  if	  dogs	  bark”	  would	  become	  (E-­‐Par)	   Dogs	  bark.	  That	  proposition	  is	  true	  if	  and	  only	  if	  dogs	  bark.	  On	  the	  face	  of	  it	  this	  move	  as	  well	  seems	  to	  be	  open	  to	  Burge`s	  objection.	  But	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case,	  as	  Künne	  remarks.	  The	  paratactic	  counterpart	  of	  the	  argument	  (A1)	   The	  proposition	  that	  dogs	  bark	  is	  true.	  Therefore,	  	   The	  proposition	  that	  dogs	  bark	  is	  true.	  (A2)	   Dogs	  bark.	  That	  proposition	  is	  true.	  Therefore,	  	   Dogs	  bark.	  That	  proposition	  is	  true	  is	  formally	  valid	  because	  here	  the	  first	  occurrence	  of	  the	  demonstrative	  designates	  the	  same	  object	  as	  its	  second	  occurrence,	  namely	  the	  proposition	  that	  dogs	  bark.	  	  Thus,	  if	  we	  want	  to	  have	  a	  version	  of	  deflationism	  that	  does	  not	  fall	  victim	  to	  Davidson's	  objection	  we	  should	  not	  only	  analyze	  the	  equivalence	  schema	  (E)	  paratactically	  but	  also	  with	  propositions	  as	  parts.	  	  	  
